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THE MERIT SYSTEM-AN ESSENTIAL OF
GOOD GOVERNMENT
MURRAY SEASONGOOD*
Burke, in the trial of Warren Hastings, observed, "Law and arbitrary
power are in eternal enmity." The same irreconcilable conflict exists,
in this country, between professional politicians and sponsors of the
merit system. This is because the aims of the two camps are completely
antagonistic. In no other place where the two party system obtains, is
the filling of offices and positions on the basis of vote-getting service
and strength and political contributions made or secured for the party,
so predominant a part of political activity. Patronage is the backbone
in the United States of the political parties in federal, state and local
political operations.1 There is, in this country, no other effective party
discipline. Thus, members of the Congress, state legislators and
municipal officers holding important positions openly oppose legisla-
tion or policies recommended by their chief executive. Here patronage
is the most effective pressure an executive can exert on members of his
party. The immense number of offices and positions created during
the terms of the late President Roosevelt enabled him to fill them in
a way that pleased those who favored his objectives and that punished
those who did not. Burke's definition of "party"
".... a body of men for promoting by their joint endeavors the national
interest upon some particular principle to which they are all agreed."
is inapplicable to politics as practiced with us.
2
Not too exaggerated is Ambrose Bierce's biting aphorism:
"Politics is a struggle of interests masquerading as a contest of principles.
The conduct of public affairs for private advantage."3
If a boss or machine politician is frank, he will tell you the merit
system is the ruination of his business. "How," he queries plaintively,
''are we to get the boys to work when we have no jobs to give them?"
*Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law; Member, Paxton
& Seasongood, Cincinnati, Ohio; Author, Local Government in the United States
(1933), Cases on Municipal Corporations (1934, 2d ed. 1941); Member, numer-
ous state and federal boards and commissions on personnel and other problems.
1. See Worthy, The Problem of Patronage, 72 GooD GOVERNMENT No. 2
(March-April 1955) (publication of National Civil Service League, 315 Fifth
Avenue, New York).
2. Seasongood, George Washington and Political Parties, 1 THE AmERICAN
SCHOLAR 265 (No. 3, May 1932).
3. Quoted in Seasongood, Public Service By Lawyers In Local Government,
2 SmRAcusE L. REV. 210, 218 (1951).
MERIT SYSTEM
A partial answer is, that he dispenses illicit special favors. But these
are numerically inadequate. Jobs and the promise of jobs are what
produce, by means fair or foul, a large vote for the organization.
Hence, the regular politician spreads false reports of poor workings of
the merit system and resorts to various ruses to thwart its most effec-
tive operation. Where some civil service is mandatory, what is fur-
nished is often not the true merit system, but a perversion of it. The
beginnings of any real civil service in this country date from about
eighty years ago. They received impetus from the Pendleton Federal
Civil Service Bill of 1883. 4 But even now, civil service, in any thing
approaching genuineness, does not exist in perhaps half the states of
the Union.
5
Civil Service is an example of the truism that no constitution or
statute, however excellent, will measurably achieve its aims if ad-
ministered by persons hostile to it with minds desirous of erring. Most
of the constitutional provisions for the merit system, as contrasted with
those for home rule for local subdivisions, are not self-executing, but
require legislation to implement them. This is the Achilles' heel of the
system, where the spears of insufficient appropriations and restrictive
and crippling legislation inflict mortal wounds.
Enemy Efforts to Impair Workings of the Merit System
To make assurance of injuries to the system doubly sure, various
devices are employed to hamstring its forward movements. Thus, for
example:
1. The set-up of a bipartisan two-member commission appointed by
the executive is a poor one. The appointed member of opposite politics
to that of the executive is often a friendly Indian who goes along with
his more vigorous colleague. Like as not, these appointments will be
made on recommendation of the governing parties of the two machines
and may be of persons who have been and continue to be intensely
partisan, with little sympathy for, or even with hostility toward the
system they are supposed to administer. Even if the commission is
composed of three or more members, the appointments to it can be of
such character as to make it unworkable. In Cincinnati, before 1926,
the Civil Service Commission, appointed by the mayor, was a sham.
Its examinations were dishonest and it was well known to be an in-
strumentality for getting into and keeping in positions those desired by
4. 22 STAT. 403 (1883).
5. THE SuRvEy 603 (November 1949); SEASONGOOD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 112 ff. (1933). Constitutional merit system provisions have
multiplied slowly since beginning in New York (1894), Ohio (1912), Colorado
(1919), California (1934), lichigan, Kansas and Louisiana (1940), Georgia
and MVissouri (1945). 64 GooD GOVERNMENT 21 (November-December 1947).
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the boss, and preventing appointments not desired by the machine, no
matter how meritorious the unwanted applicant might be.6
The provisions in the amended charter of Cincinnati,7 adopted about
thirty years ago, for the set-up of the Civil Service Commission and of
its secretary, well administered, changed all this and furnished a
sound formula for effective workings of the merit system. There are
three members "of recognized character and ability," each serving for
a term of six years. One is appointed by the Board of Directors of the
University of Cincinnati, one by the Board of Education of the Cincin-
nati School District, and one by the mayor. The city manager appoints
the secretary of the Commission who also acts as the personnel officer
of the city government and must be a person experienced in personnel
work. He also acts as chief examiner and superintends the examina-
tions subject to the direction of the Commission and he appoints all
of his subordinates.
As excellent appointments were made, the new Civil Service Com-
mission speedily brought about a real merit system. However, in the
course of time, with the domination of the appointing authorities by
the patronage-hungry Hamilton County Republican machine, appoint-
ments have not been equal to the original appointees and vicious, un-
founded attacks have been made on the Commission and its admirable
secretary. The local head of the American Federation of Labor was
named as a member of the Commission. To appoint representatives of
special interests to such a Commission is of doubtful propriety.8
2. The director or executive secretary of the Commission is a key
official. The Model State Civil Service Law, prepared by the National
Civil Service League and the National Municipal League suggests9 the
director be appointed on recommendation of the Civil Service Com-
mission by the governor. If the director is a machine politician or
otherwise out of sympathy with the merit system, he can easily
sabotage its operations.
3. A favorite method of undermining the merit system is by dis-
paraging it and curtailing appropriations. Even the best commission,
if it has no strong public support and is denied adequate funds, may
lose spirit and become so discouraged as merely to go through the mo-
6. Mosher, "Personnel Policies," in THE GOVERNMENT OF CINCINNATI AND
HAMILTON CouNTY 149 if. (1924).
7. CHARTER AN CODE OF ORDINANCES OF CINCINNATI, Art. V. §§ 1 and 2, pp.
17-18 (1945).
8. The Good Government Newsletter 2 (April 1955), of the National Civil
Service League, takes credit for the League in helping to defeat reorganization
of the Vermont Civil Service Commission which would have added a represen-
tative of the State Employees Association and a state department head. The
view of the League is that the Commission's members should represent the
public as a whole, not special interests.
9. NATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE LEAGUE, A MODEL STATE CIVIL SERVICE LAW 8
(1953).
MERIT SYSTEM
tions of administering the system. Although, as before mentioned, a
constitutional grant of the merit system is supposed to be established
in Ohio, actually it has existed and exists only to a limited degree in
the state and many municipal administrations, and practically not at
all in any real sense within the eighty-eight counties of the state. Ex-
aminations for creation of an eligible list for various positions are not
requested and are not held on the often specious ground of lack of
funds to hold them, and provisional appointees fill positions for years,
sometimes for life.10 The Model Law" provides that no such pro-
visional employments may continue longer than six months.
4. Another favorite stratagem to get away from the merit system is
for the appointing officer to classify many or even all of his employees
as deputies, holding a fiduciary relation to him, no matter how menial
and routine their duties may be.12 Such deputies are almost always
exempt by statute from the classified service. 3
5. While it is illegal' 4 through threats, inducements or otherwise to
attempt to bring about resignations, abstention from taking examina-
tions, or waiver of right resulting from being certified among the first
three in the original employment eligible list, or first in a promotional
examination, appointing officers or their accomplices frequently exert
such unlawful pressures. 5 Anyone eligible for appointment knows
that if he is unwanted his situation can, by a variety of expedients, be
made intolerable. He may be discriminated against, rated low, assigned
to territory or duties for which he is not fitted or which are disagree-
able in character, suspended for supposed disciplinary purposes with-
out pay, or subjected to the risk, indignity and expense of dismissal on
trumped-up charges. On one occasion, a machine politician holding the
10. State ex rel. Lagedrost v. Beightler, 135 Ohio St. 624 21 N.E. 2d 992
(1939). And where the authorities are coerced into holding an examination,
the test may be rigged and weighted to give undue advantage to the provisional
appointee who is taking the examination. SCHULZ, AMERICAN CITY GOVERN-
MENT 59 (1949).
11. Supra note 8, at 15.
12. State ex rel. Emmons v. Guckenberger, 131 Ohio St. 466, 3 N.E.2d 502
(1936); Townsend v. Berning, 135 Ohio St. 31, 19 N.E.2d 155 (1939).
13. E.g., OHIo REV. CODE § 143.08 (A) (9).
14. E.g., OHIo REV. CODE §§ 143.42 to 143.45.
15. The horrendous penalties and sanctions for such misconduct, as, e.g.,
those provided in Omo REV. CODE §§ 143.46 to 143.99, inclusive, are not terrify-
ing to them, especialy if the prosecuting officials are of their same political
machine and under the same leadership or bossism sympathetic with the
objectives of the appointing authority.
As the Duke said of non-use of "strict statutes and most biting laws"
"in time Rod becomes more mock'd than fear'd;
... and liberty plucks justice by the nose;..."
MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act. I, Sc. 3
And in Vienna he said:
"... the strong Statutes stand like the forfeits
in a barber's shop,
As much in mock as mark."
Id., Act V, Sc. 1.
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Hamilton County, Ohio, office of Auditor told a civil service employee
who had been appointed to a position, after fair, competitive examina-
tion, by the reform predecessor in the same office, that he did not like
the employee's wife's politics and so the employee would have to re-
sign. He refused, and the present writer appealed for him from his
dismissal to the State Civil Service Commission. That Commission,
weak and partisan as it was, ordered the employee reinstated. The
appointing officer still balked at reappointing the employee. He had
been advised the only remedy against him for his recalcitrancy would
be mandamus to compel reinstatement. But, it happened the governor
was of opposite politics from this county official; and it was delicately
conveyed to the latter there was a statute that permitted removal of
any officer not complying with a lawful order of a civil service commis-
sion. Actually, the then governor would not have removed him in a
hundred years. But the county officer feared removal and so the em-
ployee was reinstated and given back pay. However, the official
directed all in his office to give the reinstated employee the silent treat-
ment and he had his desk placed next to a steam radiator where,
during working hours, he was grilled like St. Lawrence. Before pro-
ceedings were instituted against the offender for this patent infraction
of the Civil Service Commission order, the discharged employee ob-
tained a better and higher paying position in private employment and
resigned his county position.
6. Mark Twain observed that the works of Shakespeare were not
written by Shakespeare, but by someone of the same name. A device
that has sometimes succeeded is to abolish for supposed economy an
office or position or positions filled by unwanted incumbents and then,
within as short a time as is safe, create a new office differing very little,
save in name, from the office erased.16 Or, the appointing officer will
lay off or dismiss unwanted employees as no longer needed and sud-
denly discover that he was mistaken and that somewhat similar posi-
tions must be filled; and, of course, chosen ostensibly by the nominal
appointing authority, but actually the patronage committee of the local
machine.
7. Examinations are sometimes rigged and standards for qualifica-
tions arbitrarily weighted to favor not merely a provisional appointee,
as before shown, but, as well, all those whom the appointing authority
wants to be the successful contenders. So, subjective standards may be
employed to an extent out of all proportion to a fair, open and impartial
examination.17 ,
16. State ex rel. McGann v. Evatt, 138 Ohio St. 421, 35 N.E.2d 576 (1941).
17. Cohen v. Fields, 298 N.Y. 235, 82 N.E.2d 23 (1948); Sloat v. Examiners
of Bd. of Education of New York, 274 N.Y. 367, 9 N.E.2d 12 (1937).
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8. In recent times, security checks and unsubstantiated aspersions
on the loyalty of the employee to the Government are convenient ex-
cuses for getting him out.18
9. The machine, through control of the legislature or under pressure
of powerful groups wanting special, unwarranted favors, will cause
to be enacted laws and regulations severely hampering a true merit
system and preventing good results in its operation. Then, in the words
of Milton, "They who have put out the people's eyes reproach them of
their blindness." The veterans' preferences accorded ex-members of
the Armed Forces by the Congress and various legislatures restrict fair
and free competition in examinations and opportunities for career
service and advancement in the civil service.19 The Congress especially
has been over-favorable to the veteran. A percentage credit for service
was allowed in original examinations even to those not making a pass-
ing grade. If this credit, added to his mark, enabled him to obtain a
passing grade, he was then automatically placed at the head of the
eligible list.20 And in the matter of lay-offs, veterans were the last
to be included no matter how short their term or how poor their per-
formance, in the civil service, as against long-time employees who had
served with fidelity and excellence. In the matter of dismissals, vet-
18. Cole v. Young, 125 F. Supp. 284 (D.D.C. 1954); Roth v. Brownell, 215 F:2d
500 (D.C. Cir. 1954), reversing 107 F Supp. 362 (D.D.C.), cert. denied, 75 Sup.
Ct. 89 (1954). See Note, 5 CATHOIC U. L. REV. 108-10 (1955); 11 BULL. OF THE
ATomic SciTImsTs No. 4 (April 1955) (Special issue on "Secrecy, Security,
and Loyalty.").
19. Chairman Philip Young, United States Civil Service Commission, when
questioned about retention preference for veterans when lay-offs are neces-
sary, called such retention preference "an increasingly serious situation which
will have to be dealt with," because veterans are now a majority of the total
federal population, a factor which sponsors of veterans' preference legislation
apparently did not envisage. GOOD GOVERNVIENT NEWSLETTER (April, 1955). Blue
Print for a Federal Personnel System, 72 GOOD GOVERNMENT 23, 24 (May-June
1955).
20. Mirabile dictu, the 83d Congress summoned up enough fortitude to aneiid
Sections 3 and 7 of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 58 STAT. 387, 5 U.S.C.A.
§§ 851 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1950), and passed Public Law 271, August 14, 1953,
1 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm. NEws 654 (83d Cong. 1st Sess. 1953). By this they
limited to those "who have received a passing grade" the ten points to be
added to the earned ratings of certain applicants and five points to others, and
limited the names of preference eligibles ahead of all others having the same
rating to those who had received a passing grade. For the legislative history
of this excellent enactment, see 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS 2391 (83d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1953). New procedures were instituted for appeals by prefer-
ence eligibes under Veterans' Preference Act of 1944 by the Civil Service Com-
mission, amended April 22, 1955. 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2557 (May 3, 1955).
As showing the special treatment afforded veterans, the United States
Court of Claims on April 5, 1955, ruled a "Federal agency has no authority to
place preference eligible on involuntary annual leave during 30-day notice
period preceding his removal for cause." The court held that Section 14 of the
Veteran's Preference Act means that the veteran is to have 30 days' notice in
advance of his discharge, which means in advance of his being separated from
the payroll, and that the Civil Service Conunission's regulation (5 CODE FED.
REGS. § 22.2(c) ) would permit separation from the payroll at once, rather
than only after 30 days' notice, and is in conflict with the act and is invalid.
Taylor v. United States, 23 U.S. L. WEEK 2519 (April 19, 1955) (Ct. Claims,
April 5, 1955; Laramore and Madden, JJ., dissenting)-
1955 ]
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erans received greater protection from unjust separations, in a right
to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, not accorded to non-veteran
employees. While the grant of veterans' preference credits has
generally been sustained as constitutional, such credits have usually
been allowed only in original, not promotional, examinations and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that to allow the credit to one
not attaining a passing grade in order to enable him to pass and qualify
is an impermissible assault on the merit system.21
The police and firemen's unions have successfully promoted legisla-
tion giving them and the chief of police or chief of the fire department a
right, not enjoyed by other civil service employees, to appeal from an
adverse decision of the Civil Service Commission to the courts to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the cause of their removal.2 Why these two
classes of civil service employees should have these special privileges is
not apparent. Curiously, the constitutionality of granting them does not
seem to have been attacked. Other legislation pushed through at the
instance of these unions, restricts the group eligible to take promo-
tional examinations, so that the contenders are sometimes limited to
a very small number.23 Why should not a promotional examination
for, say, an assistant chief of detectives be open to the whole police
force? They should have the privilege of competing for the position,
whether they can succeed or not. But, in practice, as before stated, the
qualifications are restricted, as e.g., limiting applicants to those already
detectives, so as to limit the number of contenders sometimes to three
or four.
Then, too, legislation has been enacted requiring in promotional
examinations written examinations only24 or proscribing, except in a
few professional positions, educational requirements.5
And, occasionally, a brazen General Assembly will take positions out
of the classified service after they have been put in it and employees
21. Maurer v. Commonwealth ex rel. O'Neill, 368 Pa. 369, 83 A.2d 382 (1951);
Commonwealth ex rel. Graham v. Schmid, 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701 (1938); cf.
McNamara v. Directors of Civil Service, 110 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Mass. 1953).
22. OHio REV. CODE § 143.27. Properly interpreted this Section affords only
a limited review and not a trial de novo. Kearns v. Sherrill, 137 Ohio St. 468,
22 N.E.2d 468 (1940). There is pending in the General Assembly of Ohio now,
however, Senate Bill 134 which would expressly permit a full trial de novo on
appeal from an adverse decision of the Civil Service Commission. Cincinnati
Enquirer, April 29, 1955. The police and fire chiefs have the sole right to appeal
to the courts from suspensions. Onto REV. CODE § 143.30.
23. Onio REv. CODE § 143.34. A state two-platoon law for firemen was held
superior, in the home rule state of Ohio, to a conflicting city ordinance. State
ex rel. Strain v. Houston, 138 Ohio St. 203, 34 N.E.2d 219 (1941).
24. OHto REV. CODE § 143.16. In State ex rel. Ethel v. Hendricks, 56 Ohio
L. R. #9, p. 93 (May 9, 1955), pending on appeal, No. 34422, in the Ohio Su-
preme Court, it was held that this Section sets forth the public policy relating
to promotional examinations that these shall be written, and the Civil Service
Commission has no power to change that policy by enacting a rule requiring
oral examinations in addition to written ones. See also State ex rel. O'Driscoll
v. Cull, 138 Ohio St. 516, 37 N.E.2d 49 (1941).
25. Oio REv. CODE § 143.15 (former Omo GE. CODE § 486-9a).
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have qualified and are serving in that service; and at the same time
will fix salaries at a high figure without reference to the salaries of
other similar employees and with no consideration of the budgeting
requirements of the city affected.26
The activities of the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL,
and its constituent Fire Fighters Locals are illustrated by Heidtman
v. City of Shaker Heights.27 Shaker Heights Fire Fighters Association,
Local No. 516, International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL, were
active in circulating an initiative petition seeking an enactment by
ordinance of the three-platoon system for firemen. The circulators
were employees of the City of Shaker Heights, Ohio, employed in the
classified service of that city as firemen in its fire department. The
council of the city decided not to certify the petition and rejected it
on the ground that, although there were sufficient valid signatures,
the ordinance was not properly proposed by the circulators for the
reason that the separate part petitions were submitted by members
of the fire department of the city and that in doing so the circulators
violated the Code of Ohio, which reads as follows:
'Political activity prohibited. No officer, employee, or subordinate in
the classified service of the state, the several counties, cities and city school
districts thereof, shall directly or indirectly, orally or by letter, solicit or
receive, or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving any
assessment, subscription or contribution for any political party or for any
candidate for public office; nor shall any person solicit directly or in-
directly, orally or by letter, or be in any manner concerned in soliciting
any such assessment, contribution or payment from any officer, employee
or subordinate in the classified service of the state, the several counties,
cities or city school districts thereof; nor shall any officer or employee in
the classified service of the state, the several counties, cities, and city
school districts thereof be an officer in any political organization or take
part in politics other than to vote as he pleases and to express freely his
political opinions."28
In a suit brought by some of the circulator firemen and the Local
for a declaration of rights, the common pleas court ruled that the action
of the plaintiffs and fifty-four other firemen in the classified service of
the city constituted a taking part in politics in violation of the statute,
but neither the initiative petition nor the proposed ordinance was
rendered illegal or void by the action of the plaintiffs and other mem-
bers of the fire department, and that the council could not refuse to
recognize the validity of the initiative petition and that the council
improperly failed to process and continue proceedings on the petition.
The Court of Appeals reversed only that portion of the judgment of
the common pleas court which held firemen had engaged in political
26. Ellis v. Urner, 125 Ohio St. 246, 181 N.E. 22 (1932).
27. 163 Ohio St. 109, 126 N.E.2d 138 (1955).
28. Oo REV. CODE § 143.41 (former OmIo GEN. CODE § 486-23).
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activity in violation of Section 486-23, and affirmed the rest of the
judgment.
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled, as shown by the second para-
graph of the syllabus:
"2. The word, 'politics,' as used in Section 486-23, General Code, Section
143.41, Revised Code, must be defined as politics in its narrower partisan
sense, and activities of municipal employees in the classified service in
circulating an initiative petition seeking enactment of an ordinance re-
lating to their employment do not constitute a taking part in politics as
that term is used in such section."29
and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In interpreting the
above section, the court did not sufficiently consider the last clause of
the section:
"or take part in politics other than to vote as he pleases and to express
freely his political opinions."
That appears to be a comprehensive prohibition of taking part in
politics except to the extent specifically permitted, namely, to vote as
he pleases and to express freely his political opinions. The use of the
initiative or referendum on behalf of one class of employees to estab-
lish their wages or conditions of work is most unfortunate. The voter
is not fully informed as to the real problems of municipal finance, nor
of what injustices may result to other employees or hardships on the
municipal authorities. Whether the firemen taking the part they did in
circulating the initiative petition was illegal, as violating Section
486-23, as held by the common pleas court, or not, as held by the Court
of Appeals, did not call for decision regarding the meaning of the word
"politics." Whether the circulators violated the law respecting their
participation in politics should not have legally prevented submission
of the initiative petition to the voters. If they violated the law, they
were personally punishable for it, and their violation should have had
no consequence as to the validity of the initiative petitions. If, contrary
to the above, the violation of law by the circulators could be a ground
for invalidation, the question of validity for that reason should have
been postponed until after vote was had by the electors.
10. If a political organization in power has appointed numbers of
its janizaries to positions without their being or having qualified under
the merit system, and so not secure under its protection, and the
administration is defeated for re-election, it suddenly disguises itself as
a great friend of the merit system, and vouches in or covers in its in-
cumbents by various plans, such as, e.g., non-competitive examinations.
Sometimes these machinations succeed and sometimes they do not.30
29. 126 N.E.2d 138, 139 (1955).




11. A rather clumsy and crude expedient for eliminating a classified
civil servant without ordinary civil service procedures of charges,
suspension, dismissal and employee appeal to the Civil Service Com-
mission, is to pass a resolution taking the unwanted employee out of
the classified service and placing him in the unclassified service, some-
times on the assigned ground that he should never have been placed
in the classified service and so is subject to dismissal at wil.31
Common Political Objections to the Merit System
Coming now to stock objections, adduced by its enemies, that are
made to the merit system, it is said that:
1. Once an incumbent comes under the protection of the classified
civil service, he feels secure in his position, becomes bureaucratic, un-
cooperative, mechanical in his operations or slothful, since he knows
it is very difficult to get rid of him. The incorrectness of this fault-
finding is apparent by reference to the standing of British civil service
public employees. They may often be somewhat rigid, technical and
unimaginative in the performance of their duties. But their traditional,
long time standards of character, efficiency and fidelity to duty are the
highest. They hold an honored position, and enjoy a lifetime career
with good opportunities for advancement in the public service.32
Aside from this, the fact is, removal of an unfit or disloyal employee
in the classified service is not too difficult, if the appointing officers
utilize their right to grade the performance of the incumbent below a
figure that must be attained for retention in office,33 or to file charges
and dismiss. 34 Actually, the employee, in the classified service, is at a
disadvantage in trying to stay in when the employer wants him out.
The employee's tenure is (R.C. 143.27), for example, in Ohio,
31. Deering v. Hirsch, 146 Ohio St. 288, 65 N.E.2d 649 (1946); Roth v.
Brownell, 215 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
32. SWISHER, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GovERN-
IMENT 396, 412 (1951). 25 POLITICAL QUARTERLY 308-09 (1954), a special number
on "The Civil Service," carries an up-to-date evaluation of the British civil
service, which began about 1854, by British officials, educators and top civil
servants themselves, including Clement R. Attlee's testimonial of their serving
with equal fidelity under Conservative or Liberal governments. See GOOD Gov-
ERNMENT NEWSLETTER (April 1955).
33. If the statutes do not expressly authorize removal through cause of grad-
ing by the superior of inefficiency, such provision can be made by ordinance
or by rule of a good civil service commission. See, e.g., CHARTER AND CODE
OF ORDINANCES OF CINCINNATI, 1945, §§ 306-5 and 303-6, the latter section as
amended by Ordinance No. 89-1955, City Bulletin, March 22, 1955, p. 7. Para-
graph (b) of the amended § 306-6 reads:
"(b) Penalty for Low Efficiency. Any employee who has two successive low
service ratings shall automatically be referred by the department or division
head to the appointing authority for such action as he deems fit under the
existing laws."
For federal rating procedures, see 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2007 (Supp. 1954).
See Hagerty, Why Not Take the "Rating" Out of Performance Rating?, 16
PUB. PERSONNEL REV. 39 (January 1955).




"during good behavior and efficient service; but any such officer or em-
ployee may be removed for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty,
drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of
the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the
commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of
misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office." 35
This section, like charity, "covers the multitude of sins,"n but in other
than the Biblical sense. Not only can the appointing authority think up
charges under such comprehensive words, as, for example, "insubordi-
nation," but the appointing officer may suspend employees, without
pay, for purposes of discipline for a reasonable period not exceeding
thirty days without any right of appeal of the employee from the
suspension,37 except in the case of chiefs of police or fire departments
or any member of a police or fire department of a city.38 Although
"successive suspensions" are not allowed, 9 appointing officers have
been known to utilize plural suspensions with short restorations after
the supension periods of time intervening.
As a generalization, the salaries of public employees are not large.
The dismissed employee is usually suspended without pay, sometimes
for a period of months pending the outcome of his appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. The difficulties in this situation are manifest, in-
eluding often inability to pay a lawyer and to obtain and compensate
witnesses, almost always fearful themselves of attendance at the trial.
The employee is in an unenviable position. If he hopes to be re-
instated within a reasonably short time, he will not seek private
employment of a permanent sort; and the difficulties of obtaining tem-
porary positions, even those of a character inferior to the position he
has filled, are grievous. If reinstatement is eventually ordered, the em-
ployee's right to recover the full salary lost during enforced separation
from his position is not certain.40 He will not be reimbursed or receive
any income tax credit for his legal and other expenses. 41 Moreover,
35. OHio REV. CoDE § 143.27.
36. Neal v. State Civil Service Comm'n, 147 Ohio St. 430, 72 N.E.2d 69 (1947).
But cf. Indiana State Personnel Bd. v. Diven, 118 N.E.2d 367 (Ind. 1954).
37. Maghan v. Board of Commissioners, 141 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
38. OHio REV. CODE § 143.26.
39. Ibid.
40. Borak v. Biddle, 141 F.2d 278, 281, 6th par. of syllabus (D.C. Cir. 1944).
Siskind v. Morgenthau, 152 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Nadelhaft v. United
States, 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2662 (Ct. Cl.) (June 28, 1955). But see Borak v. United
States, 78 F. Supp. 123 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 821 (1948); Kaufman
v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1950); Burns v. McCrary, 130 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).
41. State ex rel. Conway v. Taylor, 136 Ohio St. 174, 24 N.E.2d 591 (1939).
General Accounting Office, Comp. Gen. Dec. B-122555, Feb. 15, 1955, 23 U.S. L.
WEEK 2432 (Mar. 1, 1955), and Act of August 26, 1950, 5 U.S.C.A. § 22-1 (Cum.
Supp. 1950). Often, too, the same court which orders his reinstatement will not
grant him money redress in the same action or perhaps at all, for want of
jurisdiction. State ex rel. Shriver v. McCort, 149 Ohio St. 338 78 N.E.2d 731
(1948). But cf. Goodwin v. United States, 118 F. Supp. 369 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
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actions to compel reinstatement and recovery of lost salary may be
barred by laches2 or by the often burdensome requirement of ex-
hausting administrative procedures before bringing suit.4
In the federal service, the employee has even fewer rights. All that
is necessary is for the appointing officer to file charges good in law,
allow the employee a reasonable time to reply in writing and then,
without any hearing, find the charges established and dismiss him.
Except in the case of veterans, he has no right of appeal to the Civil
Service Commission. Such dismissal is supposed to be final without
court or other review. For the employee to go into court, nevertheless,
under such conditions on a claimed legal insufficiency of the charges or
gross abuse of discretion or fraud is a forlorn chance."
2. It is often asserted by those wanting to pick employees on a
political basis or to discriminate for other reasons against open exami-
nations, that it is not practicable to make appointments on the basis of
such examinations; and so, as an example, selection of lawyers in the
public service should not be under the merit system. The lawyer's
loyalty is to the law and to his client45 and there is no tenable reason
why lawyers in public employment should not be placed under the
merit system. If they are employed on the basis of merit and not be-
cause of political influence, better appointments will be made and the
sound lawyer will apply himself, as in the private practice, unremit-
tingly to the law without the necessity of time-consuming deflections
incident to doing political work and the fear of rendering opinions or
conducting legal matters in a way that a political superior might not
favor, even though legally sound and proper.46
3. Another favorite argument of the unfriendly is that under the merit
system implemented by the prohibitions of the Hatch Political Activity
42. Sawyer v. Stevens, No. 571 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, March 7,
1955, 23 U.S. L. WEEK 3216. Hicks v. United States Radiator Co., 127 F. Supp.
429 (E.D. Mich. 1955). Russell v. Thomas, 129 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
43. Cuiffo v. United States, 23 U.S. L. WEEK 2440 (Mar. 8, 1955) Ct. Cl.;
Fitzpatrick v. Snyder, 220 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 946
(1955); Young v. Higley, 220 F.2d 522 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
44. Benenati, Jr. v. Young, 220 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Mulligan v.
Andrews, 211 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1954),; Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630
(Ct. Cl. 1954), noted, Freedom From Arbitrary Removal in Classified Civil
Service-Real or Illusory, 49 Nw. U. L. REV. 816 (1955). But cf. Crocker v.
United States, 127 F. Supp. 568 4th par. syllabus (Ct. C1. 1955); State ex tel.
Desperz v. Board of County Comm'rs, 47 Ohio App. 1, 189 N.E. 665 (1933);
Indiana State Personnel Bd. v. Diven, 118 N.E.2d 367 (1954).
45. CommIssioN ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcUTivE BRANCH OF THE Gov-
ERNMENT, LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE 1 (1955). See, Personnel and Civil
Service Recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission, 16 PuB. PERSON-
NEL REV. 92 (April 1955); The Second Hoover Commission on Position Classifi-
cation and Pay, 16 PuB. PERSONNEL REV. 98 (April 1955).
46. Seasongood, Should the Merit System Be Used in Making Appointments
of Lawyers For Public Service, 15 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 209 (1941).
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Act47 the public employee is deprived of his rights as a citizen freely to
participate in political affairs and that such insulation is against public
policy. But, as before indicated, the classified civil service employee is
not forbidden to vote as he pleases or freely to express his political
opinion,48 and all civil service laws, it is believed, allow that much
political activity to the public employee. The wisdom of forbidding
political work, especially sometimes on the public's time, campaign
contributions and retention or loss of position depending on the politi-
cal warcry "to the victor belong the spoils" is manifest. If the em-
ployee's retention of position is dependent upon the fiat of the boss
or the governing political committee's success in the election, only the
hardy and exceptionally high-minded employee will pay no attention
to the wishes, legal or illicit, of the authority on whose decision de-
pends continuance of employment.
4. The merit system properly applied would prevent strikes of public
employees; 49 but the requirement of the giving up of all right to strike
in public employment, classified or unclassified, has often been declared
and approved by those said to be among the most ardent friends of
labor.50
It is a fact, though, that employees not infrequently have legitimate
grievances that should be presented and presented strongly in some
way. Compulsory arbitration has sometimes been suggested. But it
appears such may be an improper delegation of authority 51 and for this
reason and others is not the right solution to their problem. Anyway,
as respects these limitations on the right of the public employee, the
merit system incumbent is in no different situation than that of any
other in government service.
47. 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 118i, j, k, et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1950). The constitutionality
of this Act was sustained in United Public Workers of America, CIO v. Mitchell,
330 U.S. 75 (1947). For an interpretation of "principal employment" within
the meaning of Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 118k(a,c)), see
Anderson v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 119 F. Supp. 567 (D. Mont.
1954), and Matturi v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 23 U.S. L. WEEI
2551 (April 19, 1955).
48. E.g., OHIo REV. CODE § 143.41.
49. Carey v. Water Dep't of East Orange, 108 A.2d 21 (N.J. 1954); Opinion of
New York Civil Service Commission, In the Matter of Hatton: "the acceptance
of the right to strike by civil service employees would nullify the civil service
law itself with all its beneficial effects." Seasongood and Barrow, Unionization
of Public Employees, 21 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 327, 381 n.141 (1952).
50. Seasongood and Barrow, supra note 35, at 339, citing the oft-quoted
opinion of Judge Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216,
220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892)':
"The petitioner may have a Constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no Constitutional right to be a policeman."
And see id. at 381, n.141. A practical difficulty sometimes results from hold-
ing by a Civil Service Commission that absence from duty because of a strike
forbids employment and civil service status, namely, that there are not avail-
able others to fill the places vacated, e.g., by police, firemen, machinists.




Finally, conceding there can be sometimes valid objections to the
workings of the merit system (not a large concession, really, since the
same could be said of any human institution), any such must be
weighed against the counter evils of the political patronage formula.
An elaboration will not be attempted. The damage resulting, though,
directly and indirectly, from the spoils system is incalculable, debasing
and needlessly takes untold millions from the taxpayers' resources.
Thus, as one example, in the months between February and December,
1951, more than fifty political appointees in the Internal Revenue De-
partment resigned under fire or were dismissed; many were indicted
and a number were subsequently convicted. Appointed under patron-
age procedures, the Assistant United States Attorney General in charge
of the Tax Division of the Department of Justice was dismissed. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Assistant Commissioner and
the Deputy Commissioner in Charge of the Alcohol Tax Unit resigned.
Six of the country's sixty-four collectors resigned or were dismissed-
the bureau heads in Manhattan, Brooklyn, Boston, St. Louis, Nashville
and San Francisco-and two of these were indicted. Six Deputy Col-
lectors resigned. A Chief Field Agent in Charge of thirty-two tax
collecting offices in northern California resigned and was indicted. A
Chief Field Agent in Nevada was dismissed and was indicted. The
Chief of the Alcohol Tax Unit in New York resigned.5 2 Seemingly, how-
ever, the ordinary citizen is not easily shocked and has no great
capacity for sustained indignation or strong resolution to deracinate
demonstrated evils, and especially where his convenience or imagined
advantage is interlaced with them.
The officers and governing bodies of the American Bar Association
are fairly representative of the more successful general elements of our
population. On July 1, 1938, the House of Delegates adopted a
resolution:
"Resolved: It is the duty of the Bar to uphold the merit system in public
employment, to seek its wider adoption and better enforcement in national,
state and local governments, to demonstrate its applicability to legal
positions in the public service to attract young lawyers to a career of
holding legal positions in such service and to increase confidence in admin-
istrative agencies on the basis of such agencies being officered and staffed
by persons appointed because of merit and divorced from suspicion of
political influence."
In September, 1940, they adopted another resolution:
"Resolved, that in the opinion of this Association it is desirable that
lawyers in public positions, including examiners and staffs of administra-
tive agencies, but not including elective and policy determining heads, be
52. The Senate's One-Man FBI, READER's DIGEST (February 1952) 140, is a
story of how John J. Williams, freshman Senator from Delaware, discovered
coast-to-coast corruption in the federal tax offices.
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employed, so far as practicable, under the merit system, with the aid
of competitive examinations, and that this Association further such method
of selection."
The Federal Bar Association in October, 1938, approved, by a vote
of its Executive Council, and then by a referendum vote of the mem-
bers, the extension of the merit system to lawyers in the federal service.
The bound volume of proceedings and the Journal of the American Bar
Association since then contain many instances of support of the above
resolutions. But, they also show reports of Civil Service Com-
mittees, some members of which had no understanding of the merit
system and some who were actually opposed to it, and they show defeat
of a resolution asking for the merit system instead of the politically
appointed Internal Revenue officials. Indeed, the American Bar
Association has in the past two or three years recanted its pronounce-
ments in favor of the merit system and has either voted down, tabled
or referred to research committees, for embalming, resolutions of its
Committee on Civil Service to extend it to lawyers, marshals, post-
masters and Internal Revenue officials, for example.
53
Likewise, the attitude of the present national administration is, as
respects the merit system, mixed and spotty. On the bad side is a
Personnel Procurement Procedure of October 1954 ukase seemingly
issued from the White House purporting to impose on all departments
and agencies a requirement that vacancies be referred through the
Republican National Committee to Senators and Congressmen.
54
"The prestige of the Civil Service Commission has been greatly impaired
by the confused handling of the security issue. The political issue of this
serious problem has contributed greatly to undermining the prestige and
morale of the public service."55
The Commissioners' action in removing nine hundred deputy marshals
from the competitive service is
"viewed with suspicion as to political motives especially as the Hoover
Commission recommended placing not only such deputy marshals but
marshals as well in the competitive system, to remove them from the
political arena." 6
On the good side, the President's Executive Order No. 10577 of
53. 72 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 38 (1947); 75 id.
116-17, 186, 187-88 (1950); 76 id. 189-91 (1951); 77 id. 124, 180, 442 (1952).
For a few references in the Journal, see 28 A.B.A.J. 684-85 (1942), quoting the
resolution creating a Special Committee on Civil Service and defining its
duties; 32 id. 238 (1946); 34 id. 79 (1948); 38 id. 433 (1952). See also 15
U. OF CiN. L. REV., supra note 46, at 209; 2 SYRACUSE L. REV., supra note 3, at
210.
54. The Federal Balance Sheet, 72 GOOD GOVERNMENT 9 (March-April 1955)




November 22, 1954, amended the civil service rules and authorized a
new appointing system for the competitive service.
57
The report of the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service, of
February, 1955, recommends: "12. Improvements in the Merit System":
"(d) Bringing within the career civil service certain positions still more
or less reserved for patronage (a hangover from the mid-nineteenth
century) -attorneys, first-, second- and third-class postmasterships, rural
carriers, United States marshals, certain posts in the Bureau of Customs,
and a few posts in the United States mints. This patronage is more trouble
than advantage to the party organizations and the Congress; it introduces
a disturbing element at critical points in the civil service; and it does not
supply the executive, administrative, or professional talents needed."58
On this Task Force are distinguished administrators and well-known
friends of the merit system, including two who had served on the
United States Civil Service Commission. On the Commission itself are
at least two well-known "practical politicians" of opposite politics and
a "regular" executive secretary.59 The views of the Task Force, there-
fore, should be regarded as having greater weight than the report of
the committee itself.60
In conclusion, the battle will continue to be waged between the
spoilsmen and the friends of good government supporting the merit
system, between the professionals and the amateurs. Only public
spirit, unselfishness, persistence and the creation of an overwhelming
public sentiment through dissemination of facts will make manifest the
menace to the Republic of the spoils system and the advantages of
higher type employees and the savings resulting in greater efficiency
under a genuine merit system. These, in the long struggle, will resolve
the contest in substantial degree favorably towards better and more
democratic processes of government.
57. Id. at 11. See also 71 GOOD GovRlmENr 51-52 (Sept.-Oct. 1954).
58. See comment in support of the recommendation at pp. 130-37 of the
Report of the Task Force.
59. For the dissents and separate statements of Commissioners Clarence J.
Brown and James A. Farley, see REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE 1TASK FORCE ON
PERSONNEL AND CIVIL SERVICE 89-91 (1955).
60. For a short summary of the recommendations of the Commission, released
April 11, 1955, see 23 U.S. L. WEEK 2516 (April 12, 1955). See also, Personnel
and Civil Service Recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission, 16 PuB.
PERSONNEL REV. 92-97 (April 1955)..
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